This historiographical "tour" essay examines the many meanings that have been ascribed to Pernambuco's "Peddlers' War" (1710-1711 in nearly 200 years of historical literature. Looking across generations and intellectual paradigms (Marxist, liberal, Brazilian nationalist, and Pernambucan regionalist), it shows that 1710-1711 has stood for a nativist and perhaps a republican movement against the Portuguese, a fracturing between the mercantile bourgeoisie and planter class, or as a symbol of Pernambuco's historic rebelliousness in the wake of oppression by outsiders. Focusing primarily on Pernambucan debates, it also examines the seasoned, if brief, reflections on the event by colonial historians beyond Brazil-including an unpublished 1957 US dissertation-that suggests how much the discussion of the events of 1710-1711 has to tell us about shifting currents of intellectual and political life in Pernambuco.
merchants and businessmen, overwhelmingly Portuguese and residents of Recife, and
Brazilian-born planters who clustered around (but rarely inhabited) the capital of Olinda. 7 Until the novelist José de Alencar (1829-1877) popularized the idea of a "Peddlers' War" (Guerra dos Mascates) in a two-volume work of historical fiction, published in 1873 and 1874, the conflict of 1710-1711 had been known by many different names. It was designated, at various points in time, a revolt, revolution, calamidade (calamity), agitação (agitation), alteração (alteration), uprising, conspiracy, civil war, and sedição (sedition). 8 If one finds much instability in what to call the "Peddlers' War," dividing the conflict into its rival factions is challenging, as extant historical documents mobilize historical insults in a moment of open conflict. Rather than encountering Portuguese merchants or Brazilian-born planters, we find marinheiros (sailors), pés-rapados (barefoot people), and pés de chumbo (lead feet, or as Caio Prado Júnior suggests, something akin to "blockheads" 9 ). In fact, the idea of the "Peddlers'
War" mobilizes a historical pejorative term for merchants, whose enemies characterized them not as powerful businessmen but mere hawkers or hucksters (mascates). 10 At the most basic level, however, the scope and immediate repercussions of the Peddlers' War also remain uncertain. For example, estimates on the loss of life have varied widely-from a mere three to some 727 souls 11 -presenting the odd distinction of being "bitter but not particularly bloody." 12 Beginning with the commentary of the historian Robert Southey (1774-1843), this essay examines the space that the Peddlers' War has occupied in nearly 180 years of historical literature both among professional historians and learned writers of history. 13 Of primary interest is what the conflict has meant to successive generations of academic and nonacademic writers who have ascribed a shifting variety of "big" meanings to 1710-1711. The eighteenthcentury struggle has stood for a nativist and perhaps a republican movement against the Portuguese, a fracturing between the mercantile bourgeoisie and planter class, or as a symbol of Pernambuco's historic rebelliousness in the wake of oppression by outsiders, be they the monarchy, the Brazilian Empire, or the Republic. 14 This short historiographical roadmap breaks new ground by plotting points of agreement and overlap among trained historians and writers of history. In doing so, it puts commentators into conversation, often for the very first time. It also calls attention to a forgotten student of 1710-1711, George W. Starling, whose 1957 doctoral dissertation arguably remains the most complete study of the Peddlers' War in the English language. 15 Placing Starling's work into a conversation with the most recent, serious study of the Peddlers' War, written by the major historian of colonial Pernambuco, Evaldo Cabral de Mello (b. 1936) , shows that interpretations and conclusions drawn from 1710-1711 have developed raggedly for two centuries. However, a close examination of citation practices shows that many scholars have independently reached similar conclusions and that their concerns might be shared with others despite distinctions of time period or language. Tracing unintentional interchanges in addition to purposeful, and even impassioned, ones is a useful exercise for two reasons. First, it encourages researchers to form new questions. Second, this essential task reminds us that the study of the past is a consistent barometer of contemporary politics.
The works that inform this essay were selected for their scholarly variety and to offer some account of how attempts at gleaning the "essence" of the 17 In his two-volume History of Brazil, Southey found in the previous century's struggle between Olinda and Recife the "natural tendency of all colonies toward republicanism." 18 Southey's recovery of the Peddlers' War was decisive for Pernambucan intellectualsstatesmen. In the aftermath of the more unambiguously separatist revolts of 1817, 1824 (the Confederation of the Equator), 1848-1849 (the Praieira revolt), Pernambuco's homens públicos (public men) not only found in 1710-1711 the DNA of independence but also a validation of Pernambucan exceptionalism. That is, they combined a positivist narrative of historical progression with a longstanding tradition of regionalist identification. One year after the 1889 declaration of the Republic, Major José Domingues Codeceira (1820-1904) declared before a session of the Instituto Arqueológico, Histórico e Geográfico Pernambucano (IAHGP) that Pernambuco, given its deep history of resistance that extended back to wars against the Dutch in 1654, was the "the first province that planted the sovereign tree of Brazilian independence, watering it with the precious and generous blood of its sons." 19 Local writers of history (hardly professional historians) included the Peddlers' War's beneath Pernambuco's "saintly ark of glorious revolts" based on sketchy reports that Olindenses (mainly planters and their partisans) debated breaking with the crown during the first stages of the conflict. 20 During a clandestine meeting held in November 1710, Bernardo Vieira de Melo, a sugar mill owner and hero of the wars against the Dutch, purportedly delivered a grito da liberdade (cry of freedom), proposing that the ad hoc assembly establish an autonomous republic "like that of the Venetians." 21 As the English historian C. R. Boxer would later warn, so "much hard lying is involved in this conflict of evidence, that the exact truth is probably unascertainable, nor does it greatly matter." 22 The lack of solid evidence did not prevent an imagined radical assembly from assuming a life of its own, and much debate, academic and otherwise, swirls around the existence of Vieira's "cry of freedom." If such a proposition was made, Pernambuco would seem to have declared independence several decades before the United States (1776) and the Inconfidência Mineira (1789).
A Tale of Creditors and Debtors: An Early Economic Account of 1710-1711
Representing the Peddlers' War as an early example of "nativist republicanism" remained unchallenged until the throes of the First World War, when a Brazilian consul to Lisbon published a polemical, but mostly forgotten, indictment of his forbearers. In Guerra dos Mascates (Olinda e Recife), Vicente Ferrer de Barros Wanderley Araújo (1857 challenged several canonical assumptions about the conflict that he implied were based on big leap speculation. 23 In particular, he complained that 1710-1711 had "been studied beneath a perspective unfavorable to the people of Recife, giving the nobility of Olinda an eminently patriotic position, one which they neither had nor could have had." 24 Reassessing the conflict in financial terms, he concluded that planters' initial revolt of 1710 and the ensuing melee centered on their perennial inability (or their unwillingness) to repay debts to their merchant creditors, a situation that he argued closely mirrored planters' 1654 revolt against the Dutch. 25 While perhaps the most important of Ferrer's interventions is a focus on the financial bonds that linked merchant and planter, creditor and debtor, he also rebuked his learned colleagues for "limiting themselves to copying old and erroneous opinions" not reflected in the extant historical documents. 26 Referring to an 1890 legislative decree commemorating Bernardo Vieira de Melo's declaration of independence, Ferrer vigorously condemned what he called a "legalized lie" about the "cry of freedom" allegedly given on November 10, 1710. 27 He argued that no written evidence supported the holding of a secret meeting in Olinda, and even if an insurgent had voiced their support for a república, talk of a "republic" in the early eighteenth century would have referred quite broadly to any form of rule, certainly not the sort of republicanism espoused by learned men of the nineteenth century. 28 At the same time, Ferrer determined that Pernambuco's "sons of the soil" had no reason to demand political autonomy because "their only ideal was to govern the captaincy … [by] barring the inhabitants of Recife … from jobs and posts but with a complete and humbling submission to the king." 29 Anticipating the conclusions of English-speaking professional historians in the mid-twentieth century, as we will see below, Ferrer determined that Pernambucan planters had no incentive to break with the crown but rather to check the economic dominance-and growing political influence-of Recife's mercantile elite.
Vicente Ferrer's 1915 monograph is also noteworthy for its positive assessment of Pernambuco's (largely Portuguese) merchant community and mercantile capitalism more broadly. In contrast to planters, whom he describes as decadent, opportunistic, and reactionary, merchants emerge as the vital "plasma of the state that, for the first time, presented itself as cohesive and gregarious … being the practical base of commerce and industry that would interest modern countries." 30 Indeed, Ferrer contends that Recife's incipient mercantile bourgeoisie was a harbing of progress due to its deep cosmopolitanism and enterprising spirit. From an even wider angle, he argues that merchants were important beneficiaries of Dutch rule in Pernambuco (1630-1654), a "golden age" and the "true discovery" of Brazil, when "rational administration" led to much scientific and literary progress. 31
Challenging a Legacy of Underdevelopment through Eighteenth-Century Anticolonialism
With few exceptions, the later generation of Brazilian scholars either ignored the work of Vicente Ferrer or, in the case of Pernambucan intellectuals, strongly denied his conclusions as if they were assaults on their personal honor. 32 However, the magnitude of his intervention is revealed in the later tendency to discuss the Peddlers' War in economic, if nationalistic, terms.
In the 1930s and 1940s, Brazilian historiography underwent a major shift as colonial economic systems were debated in terms of Brazil's enduring legacy of underdevelopment. 33 Although he did not mention the conflict by name in his path-breaking 1942 work Formação do Brasil contemporâneo, the Marxian historian and political economist Caio Prado Júnior (1907 -1999 used an antagonism between merchants and planters to unpack the deeply engrained contradictions (or "vices") of the colonial system. He argued that Portuguese (and immigrant) merchants succeeded in monopolizing Luso-Brazilian trade, consequently starving Brazilian-born protagonists, like planters, of their livelihood. 34 In the capital of Recife, public men of substance also latched on to economic explanations to comprehend the dwindling of Pernambuco's sugar industry and the economic downgrading of the traditional planter class. Mário Melo (1884 Melo ( -1959 , a son of Pernambuco's sugar aristocracy and a prolific attorney, journalist, historian, and politician, did not disguise his contempt for what he called the exploitative practices of Recife's unscrupulous merchants. In Afirmações nacionalistas: a Guerra dos Mascates (1942), he characterized the mercantile community as an abusive proxy of Portuguese empire that caused planters to "fall into the hands of usury." 35 He also dismissed Ferrer's misgivings about the alleged grito da liberdade.
Drawing on the same documents that Ferrer used to disprove the idea 28 years earlier, Melo identified a number of passages that "proved" that Pernambucan planters intended to form a republic independent of the Portuguese crown. 36 However, he did not seem to recognize that the body of letters used to support the idea of an independent republic conveyed mistakably pro-merchant attitudes, as Ferrer had concluded in 1915. 37 Former federal deputy and governor of Pernambuco, Barbosa Lima Sobrinho (1897-2000), too, offered a sympathetic assessment of Olinda's planters given the enormous precarity of their financial situation. In a 1962 booklet commemorating the 250th anniversary of the "revolution" of 1710, he showed that Pernambuco's "sons of the soil" struggled to satisfy their accounts with Recife's merchants, those "demanding creditors, men who always gained from the production of sugar" and simultaneously remained "free from all risks of this production." 38 Lima also attacked Vicente Each of these historians stepped outside established analytical frameworks that they considered "uncritical, nationalistic, and [abundant] in hypotheses without sufficient documentation." 43 Like Ferrer four decades earlier (although only Starling cites his work 44 ), Boxer and Starling criticized their Brazilian colleagues for allowing dogmatic fantasies to distort the social and political realities of the eighteenth century. Starling, for instance, criticized Mário Melo's Afirmações nacionalistas (1942), a work he found "well-documented but chauvinistic" and contradictory because its author could not draw objective conclusions from his evidence. 45 Like Russell-Wood, Starling and Boxer also determined that at no point did Olindenses seek to dissolve the umbilical cord linking colony and metropole. "Be as it may," Boxer inferred, "the majority were not yet ready for such a dramatic break with the mother country." 46 Russell-Wood even blamed the "nationalist fervor" of Brazilians and clumsy English translations for scholars' larger mischaracterization of the eighteenth century as a string of wars and revolts. Pointing not only to 1710-1711 but also the War of the Emboabas (1706-1707; 1708-1709) and the "Minas Conspiracy" (1789), he contended that various "revolts," "wars," and "disturbances" sought to uphold the economic and social status quo rather than throwing off the yoke of Portuguese rule. 47 Despite their aforementioned criticisms, Boxer, Starling, and Russell-Wood also recognized the legitimacy of the debates so central to their Brazilian counterparts. Unlike Vicente Ferrer, each acceded to the possibility that there was "loose" talk of separating from Portugal. However, the fact that there was no guiding plan for such a break-in addition to the presumed minority position of a separatist faction-made such a proposition untenable and indeed undesirable. 48 Moreover, English-speaking historians did not divest 1710-1711 of its "revolutionary" meaning. Rather, they contended that its proper significance could only be revealed when illuminated through the separatist revolts of the nineteenth century. Starling, for example, hypothesized that the so-called Peddlers' War left an important "residue of colonial bitterness which lingered until Brazil's independence." 49 Stated differently by Boxer, it kindled a requisite "national consciousness" needed for successful movements against the crown in the nineteenth century. 50 In short, the demand for independence was an iterative process, as Amaro Quintas had also proposed, requiring the deepening of animosities and the passage of time to be successful a full century later, most outstandingly during the Pernambucan revolt of 1817.
While it shares Boxer's and Russell-Wood's interest in understanding tectonic shifts in
Portuguese imperial history, one must not overlook the uniqueness of George W. Starling's contribution. While most early works in English reserved a comparatively small number of pages for 1710-1711, his 450-page dissertation examines the conflict in granular detail while also situating it in the colonial metropole's "broad developmental program" for Brazil. 51 Starling shows how mounting financial and diplomatic pressures in the final third of the seventeenth century had far-reaching consequences in the colony. More often than not, the Overseas Council intensified its involvement in colonial affairs to finance costly wars in Europe (such as the War of Spanish Succession) or to collect revenue for royal court costs. 52 Coupled with rising costs of slaves and falling prices of sugarcane, he concludes that the crown's hyper-extractive policies were especially burdensome for Pernambuco's planter class.
It should be noted that although Vicente Ferrer was aware of the systemic pressures that encumbered planters, he was curiously silent on the matter, relating the planter-merchant relationship in unequivocally moral terms, as we have seen. 53 Starling, however, reads the issue of planter indebtedness as an outcome of imperial financial policy, which tended to benefit the "industrious European born, or oriented, Portuguese commercial class." 54 Taken as a whole, the main limitation of George Starling's approach is its inability to answer what made 1710-1711 a deeply personal affair. As we will see, a detailed understanding of eighteenth-century interpersonal norms is needed to locate the missing piece of the puzzle Former diplomat and major historian of colonial Brazil Evaldo Cabral de Mello (b. 1936)-to whom we turn momentarily-examines the multithreaded links between planters and merchants, town and country albeit in eighteenth-century Pernambuco. 61 However, he shows that the intertwining of both is characterized by an unusual degree of fragility, which is as much a consequence of Old Regime society and politics as the exceptional aspects of early Pernambucan history. Even by eighteenth-century standards, the enduring row between planters and merchants in Olinda and Recife was unusually violent not to mention remarkably far-reaching, even inclusive. As we will see below, the events of 1710-1711 succeeded in joins a primarily Rio de Janeiro-based circle of historians in calling for a serious reappraisal of the relationship between the metropole and its colonial outposts. 63 In this vein of thinking, the Peddlers' War, like other eighteenth-century uprisings in Brazil, actually exposes the weakness of the crown, which was unable to impose itself until at least the second half of the century. 64 In fact, Cabral maintains that the limited reach and general weakness of the Portuguese monarchy between 1666 and 1711 paralleled to a surprising extent the situation in France, where elitedriven civil wars (the Fronde) raged between 1648 and 1653. 65 Like his predecessors, Cabral credits an overarching "hegemonic" antagonism between plantation and shop with prefiguring a sequence of disputes that culminated with 1710-1711 in Pernambuco. However, he suggests that the "true" nature of the conflict-that is, a power struggle between urban creditors and rural debtors-remained hidden behind a "disingenuous local façade," namely the struggle over Recife's elevation to a village. 66 While this base antagonism was an important driver of social and political conflict in Portuguese America,
Cabral argues that its manifestation in Pernambuco was singularly explosive. Even no-nonsense
Russell-Wood did not deny the distinctiveness of the captaincy in this regard. He wrote that in Salvador, a major port city where mercantile and agricultural interests converge through the "enterprising individual," never attained an equivalent degree of animosity between planters and merchants. 67 As Cabral explains it, Pernambuco's 24-year occupation and recolonization by the Dutch raised the stakes of, even inflamed, the dichotomy that found less volatile expressions elsewhere in Brazil.
Evaldo Cabral reminds us that in Pernambuco the Dutch bifurcated the sugar industry into two national halves. The Portuguese (or foreigners) managed finance and lending while production remained in the hands of (largely Brazilian-born) planters. Instead of "arrang[ing] an urban center that integrated the sugar aristocracy and mercantile activity," the flamengos (as the Dutch were called) improved, fortified, and expanded the port (Recife) while Olinda, set ablaze by the Dutch in 1631, remained an urban "façade" for rural producers who only periodically ventured from their plantations. 68 The Recife-Olinda complex, a Dutch social and productive division, was a singularity in Portuguese America. In terms of its consequences for merchantplanter relations, Cabral argues that it set into motion a permanent "divorce between urban and rural" life in the captaincy. Geographic distance corresponded with social segregation. While port cities like Rio de Janeiro and Salvador integrated the rural aristocracy and merchants through a shared urban center-perhaps an eighteenth-century example of Viotti's notion of urban "conciliation"-Recife and Olinda developed a distinctive "neighborly rancor," the byproduct of birth and class animosities. 69 While Stuart Schwartz finds that ties of blood alleviated hostilities between merchants and planters, who were also bound by business interests, Cabral argues that the situation was quite different in Pernambuco. He argues that both groups practiced forms of "social apartheid," though for different reasons, ranging from general endogamy to rigid hierarchies of specialization and status imposed by their respective religious orders. Thus, in Pernambuco "exogamy would only partially triumph over class exclusivism" on the eve of 1710-1711. 70 Said social, spatial, and productive forms of "apartheid," of course, can be understood as the logical outcomes of Dutch rule. However, Pernambucan-born planters incubated aristocratic pretentions after leading wars against the Dutch, finally expelling them in 1654. Cabral shows that these pró-homens (or illustrious men, as Cabral calls them) invoked customary privilege as descendants of the old heroes of the Pernambucan Insurrection (Insurreição Pernambucana). 71 As we have seen in the opening to this essay, Pernambucans (partisans of Olinda) behaved as "nobles of the soil" during the invasion of Recife in November 1710, sporting aristocratic insignia and feathered hats (also a performance of the "noble savage"). Cabral also shows that planters' magnanimous status justified their overthrow of Jerônimo de Mendonça Furtado (also known as "Xumbergas"), the fourth governor of Pernambuco since the expulsion of the Dutch. 72
This well-rehearsed strategy, of course, would be repeated in 1710, when Governor Sebastião de Castro e Caldas was driven out of the captaincy. From a wider angle, planters maintained their prerogative to control local political institutions like the câmara. Hardly defending the bravado of pró-homens, Cabral finds a certain repugnance in the "inaction and complicity" of Pernambuco's câmaras and judges, who rarely punished offenders because they were often friends and relatives of the accused. 73 Yet in addition to inciting a certain rebellious attitude among planters, the Dutch occupation of Pernambuco also gave Recife's class of merchants its first taste of administrative autonomy. Indeed, the port was granted a separate câmara under the auspices of the Dutch West India Company (WIC), plausibly whetting its appetite for local selfgovernment. 74 The argument that Pernambuco's "illustrious" sons tried to prevent merchants from amassing political power by citing customary privilege is not new. However, Evaldo Cabral's attention to the conventions that oversaw local rule sheds new light on the stakes of 1710-1711. 75 He reminds us that the planter-dominated legislature of Olinda not only served as a coffer for royal funds, as George Starling concluded, but also a coveted node in a complex system of patronage. 76 In a political world in which "governing means appointing" (governar é nomear), elites' access to political power was derived from controlling the mechanisms of distributing favors. The elevation of Recife to a village or borough meant that planters no longer controlled the key wellspring for dispensing appointments and favors to partisans. 77 Far from being relevant only to the controlling the legislature, Cabral advises that the preponderance of patron-client ties also explains the wide range of social groups that were drawn in to the conflict. As we have seen, indigenous leaders, black regiments, enslaved persons, administrators from other captaincies, hawkers, and petty planters, among others, involved themselves in the elite or seigniorial dispute. 78 That the conflict assumed a "popular" dimension reveals the vastness of bonds between patrons and clients. Cabral reminds his readers that in Old Regime societies-certainly not the bourgeois ones we are familiar with todayconflicts were expressed in terms of familial honor as opposed to abstract categories of debt or property, to provide two examples. 79 Said honor was also articulated through notions of extended kinship. Thus, a conflict between two parties-such as the enduring row between debtor planters and creditor merchants-succeeded in rousing large segments of the captaincy and beyond through seemingly infinite chains of patron-client obligations. Father Antônio Gonçalvez Leitão, an historical observer of the conflict, wrote that "One of the things that the devil learned most about the plots to continue the hate and wars in Pernambuco" was the division that divided all the people of this land into two factions. Both the one that followed the part of Recife and the other of the nobility aroused the spirits of everyone, so that parents and children, husbands and wives, brothers, in short, friends and relatives, and likewise whites and blacks, the big and small, men and women all had differing opinions and found that they could not agree. 80 In a social world regulated by vendettas and what Cabral terms "clan-based justice" (justiça clânica), it comes as no surprise that the Peddlers' War attained violent proportions and whose grasp extended far beyond the sister cities of Recife and Olinda. 81 Indeed, Cabral insightfully surmises that the mobilization of distant rural parishes (freguesias) and militias had much less to do with actors' personal sympathies than bonds of "domestic and clientelist solidarity." 82 In his 1957 dissertation, George W. Starling came close to understanding the importance of patronage in 1710-1711 and the early eighteenth-century world writ large. Nevertheless, his socioeconomic focus, mediated through liberal understandings of social norms made available to him, could not adequately explain the partiality and arbitrariness of eighteenth-century actors, on the one hand, and the enlisting of black regiments, who were purportedly "bribed" (or otherwise coerced) by the merchants or planters, on the other. 83
Conclusion
If neither a "war" waged by (or against) "peddlers," neither an antimonarchical nor antiimperial uprising, what do we make of Pernambuco's hallowed but mostly forgotten "Peddlers'
War"? Our assessment of the extant historical literature-which does not discriminate between professional and learned (nonacademic) history-writing-shows that 1710-1711 has been the focus of significant contestation and mythmaking. The variety of "big" meanings extrapolated from the conflict-including stirrings of nationalist and separatist sentiment, the ascendancy of urban and maritime commercial interests over the rural, among others-recalls the adage that the study of history is "present politics past." As we have seen, nineteenth-century observers assigned importance to a sequence of explicitly separatist revolts (most notably 1817 and 1824, but also 1848-1849) by invoking the myth of a "Pernambuco teimoso," the captaincy (and later province) whose native sons fiercely resisted the subjugation of outsiders, be they the Dutch or the Portuguese. The idea of a "Peddlers' War"-in addition to the abovementioned insurrections-also lent itself to various projects of regionalist mythmaking following the proclamation of the Republic in 1889. In the middle of the twentieth century, we also find local (i.e., Recife-based) statesmen and intellectuals invoking 1710-1711 to explain the demise of Pernambuco's ancient sugar industry and the growth in economic importance of Brazil's Southeast (namely Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo).
Apart from a handful of English-speaking historians, research and debate about the "Peddlers' War" has been homegrown, elite-driven, and mostly untouched by the academy. 84 It may well be that a self-consciously aristocratic conflict is of greatest interest to the traditional intelligentsia (generally not university-based), which has long recounted the exploits of, and carefully charted the genealogy of, Pernambuco's noble families (also their ancestors). In striking contrast, the "Pernambucan revolution" of 1817 has garnered a broader kind of attention. As a "popular," democratic foil to 1710-1711, it has inspired an exciting proliferation of artworks, monographs, graphic novels, and didactic materials. Yet the small sampling of works examined here reminds us that 1817, 1824, and 1848-1849 cannot be understood apart from eighteenth-century conspiracies, insubordinations, uprisings, and civil wars, if for the sole reason that these Old Regime struggles legitimized liberally inspired ones during the nineteenth century.
It has also been my goal to call greater attention to the conflict that Barbosa Lima Sobrinho so regretfully describes in the epigraph to this essay. Central to his remarks is a troubling awareness that the Peddlers' War cannot easily lend itself to quasi-mythical odes to "Pernambuco teimoso," the headstrong "Lion of the North" that expelled its Dutch colonizers and even formed a provisional government independent of the Portuguese crown during the Pernambucan Revolt of 1817. In terms of developments in the historical literature over the past four decades, the Peddlers' War has been eclipsed by 1817 and to a similar extent, the Praieira revolt (1848-1849). 85 The publication of no fewer than three major monographs (not to mention a deluge of master's theses, doctoral dissertations, and journal articles) preceded the bicentennial of Pernambuco's independence in 2017. 86 From a still wider angle, this essay has argued that the multiplicity of labels ascribed to 1710-1711 is symptomatic of the event's embeddedness in not a liberal or modern sociopolitical order, but rather a monarchical and decidedly aristocratic one. And while the interventions spotlighted here underline the advantages of using well-studied and emblematic events or theories to deduce the meaning of more remote incidents, they also remind us that mismatched points of reference can be disfiguring. To be sure, because of incompatible analogies, nearly 180 years of scholarship on the Peddlers' War has struggled to understand Pernambuco's early modern past on its own terms. It has shown that neither the nationalist-regionalist fantasies of noted public figures (homens públicos) nor trained historians' narratives of class conflict and outside oppression came close to understanding the intricate contours of empire and colonialism in the early eighteenth-century world. In this regard, Evaldo Cabral de Mello's proposed analogy of Fronde-era politics in late seventeenth-century France is especially appropriate, as it is a crucial step towards unraveling the complexities of the "Old Regime" in the tropics.
Notas
Note: All translations from Portuguese to English were produced by the author (unless otherwise noted). He accepts responsibility for inadvertent errors or omissions. 1 Cited in Potiguar Matos' introduction to QUINTAS, Amaro. "Pródromos da Guerra dos Mascates." Cadernos de História v. 1, n. 2, p. 3, 1967. "É a mais infeliz de tôdas, a mais discutida, a mais negada e contestada, a que menos consegue avultar nos fastos pernambucanos." 2 There is wide disagreement over how many Olindenses invaded Recife. The early historian of Brazil, Robert Southey, suggests that approximately 20,000 persons marched on the city, while statesman-scholar Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, channeling the work of historian and statesman Manuel de Oliveira Lima, speculates that only around 1,000 invaded Recife. George W. Starling 
